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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL ROBERT DULIN,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

:

Case No. 890274-CA

:

GERALD L. COOK, Warden,
t
Utah State Prison, et al.
Defendants-Respondents.

Category No. 3

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a dismissal of a petition for post
conviction relief, entitled writ of habeas corpus by plaintiff,
filed pursuant to Rule 65B(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989) as the
Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to this Court on May
5, 1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the post conviction court erred in

dismissing the petition.
2.

Whether the post conviction court was correct in

deciding this petition on the legal issues without holding an
evidentiary hearing.
3.

Whether the evidence established by the court below

was sufficient to support plaintiff's conviction.

4.

Whether plaintiff's felony convictions were barred

under the single criminal episode doctrine by his guilty plea to
a separate misdemeanor charge.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies are included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, Michael Robert Dulin, filed a petition for
post conviction relief, which he entitled Application for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, on September 14, 1988, in the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Record
[hereinafter R.] at 7-9). The petition was assigned to the
Honorable Leonard H. Russon, District Judge.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
September 26, 1988 (R. at 56-57) and the court granted the motion
in a written ruling on December 7, 1988 (R. at 103-110).

The

court signed an order to that effect on December 29, 1988 (R. at
114-15).

Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on December 30, 1988

(R. at 123).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The record in this case contains only the pleading file
since no hearing was held and transcripts of the criminal matters
have not been provided by plaintiff.

However, the trial judge in

the post-conviction matter is the same judge who heard the trial
of plaintiff's felony criminal charges (R. at 104). In his
ruling, the judge set forth the pertinent facts from the criminal
charges (R. at 104-107); these facts do not differ significantly

from the facts cited by plaintiff in his petition and his brief
on appeal with its accompanying exhibit.

This statement of the

facts will be taken from the trial court's ruling, with
differences from plaintiff's petition and brief noted separately.
The trial court's exposition of the facts underlying
plaintiff's criminal convictions is as follows:
On May 27, 1982[,] Dulin was charged with
the crime of Escape From Official Custody,
and subsequently pled guilty to Attempted
Escape, a Third Degree Felony, and was
sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0 to 5
years in the Utah State Prison, to run
consecutively with the sentence he was then
presently serving. He apparently was placed
on parole because on May 25, 1984, Dulin was
charged with the crime of Possession of a
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person. On
May 29, 1984, he pled guilty to a reduced
charge of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon, a
Class A Misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one
year in the Salt Lake County Jail or the Utah
State Prison.
On June 11, 1984, Dulin was charged with
the crimes of Burglary, a Third Degree
Felony; Theft, a Second Degree Felony; and
Habitual Criminal, a First Degree Felony.
Dulin pled not guilty to those crimes. A
Motion to Dismiss was filed on September 17,
1984[,] and heard. It was then argued that
these charges arose out of the same criminal
episode for which he earlier pled guilty to
the charge of Possession of a Dangerous
Weapon, and which he was then currently
serving sentence. A Memorandum in support of
the Motion to Dismiss was filed at the same
time, setting forth the facts upon which the
said Motion was based. Dulin stated in his
Memorandum that the burglary and theft for
which he was being tried had occurred between
11:30 p.m. and 12:30 a.m., and that he was
arrested at 2:10 a.m. by the police while he
was elsewhere in a City Cab. He had been in
the Old City Saloon since 1:48 a.m., had
shown a gun, and left at 2:10 a.m. by City
Cab. The police were advised on this and
they stopped the cab, located the gun and
arrested Dulin. To the charge of Possession
of a Deadly Weapon by a Restricted Person[,]
-3-

Dulin pled guilty in Circuit Court. Dulin
claims that the burglary and theft therein of
Omega Drive-In between 11:30 p.m. and 12:30
a.m., as well as his carrying a weapon at
2:10 a.m. at a different location constituted
a single criminal episode, and since he had
already been convicted of the "weapons"
charge, he could not be subsequently charged
with the burglary and theft charges.
The Court at that time gave careful
consideration to the arguments of counsel,
and the Memoranda of Points and Authorities,
and denied the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that
the earlier crimes of Burglary and Theft were
not part of the same criminal episode as the
subsequent crime of Possession of a Weapon.
The case was then tried before the Judge,
the defendant having waived his right to a
jury trial, and at the end of the evidence
and argument of counsel, the Court found the
defendant guilty as charged . . . .
(R. at 105-107).
This recitation is not in basic conflict with
plaintiff's version of the facts which he included in his
memorandum of law in support of the petition for post conviction
relief.

Plaintiff cites the facts as follows:
The [plaintiff] was charged with Count I,
Burglary, a third degree felony, Count II,
Theft, a second degree felony, and Count III,
Habitual Criminal, a first degree felony.
These charges arose from an episode beginning
at approximately 12:30 midnight when a
burglary was discovered and ending about 2:10
a.m., with the [plaintiff's] arrest.
An employee returned to the Omega drive
in, located at 3490 South State St., Salt
Lake City, Utah[. U]pon his return to the
drive in[,] the employee found that the
drive-in had been burglarized, and that a
gun, a .38 Erma Watt automatic, was missing
and this was reported to the Salt Lake County
Sheriff[']s Office by the employee of the
drive in.
At approximately 1:40 a.m., according to
bartender, Dick Calder, the [plaintiff] came
into the Old Hotel saloon with a gun and he
left the bar at 2:10 a.m.[. A]t this time[,]
the West Valley Police Department was
-4-

dispatched to the bar because they had
recieved [sic] a call stating that a
convicted person was in possession of a gun
and had just entered a City Cab. The
[plaintiff] was arrested about 2;15 a.m. by
the West Valley Police Department.
The [plaintiff] was charged by the State
of Utah through the Salt Lake County
Attorney[']s Office, in the Third District,
Fifth Circuit Court, West Valley, [w]ith
"POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A
RESTRICTED PERSON"[,] a second degree felony.
In an information subscribed and sworn on the
25[th] day of May, 1984. [sic] The charge
arose out of the above facts. Preliminary
hearing was set for June 5, 1984, at witch
[sic] time the [plaintiff] entered a plea
pursuant to negotiations with the Salt Lake
County Attorney[']s [OJffice and the
[plaintiff's] attorney, Manny Garcia. The
[plaintiff] entered a plea of guilty to an
amended information of[] "Possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person"[,] a
class "A" misdemeanor. The [plaintiff] at
this time waived his right to a presentence
report and was sentenced to one (1) year in
the Utah State Prison forthwith. . . .
On the 11[th] day of June, 1984, the
[plaintiff] was again charged by the Salt
Lake County Attorney[']s [0]ffice, by and
through the State of Utah, in the Third
District, Fifth Circuit Court[,] with the
three charges listed[ above] . . . . These
charges arose out of the same facts and same
information stated above . . . .
(R. at 10-11).

To this recitation of facts, plaintiff added that

he did not appeal his convictions because of advice from his
attorney, Frances M. Palacios, of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders
Association.

Plaintiff said that his attorney "stated to the

Petitioner/Defendant that the State of Utah would not let the
Petitioner/Defendant win an appeal." (R. at 8).
Later, in a response to defendants' motion to dismiss
the petition for post conviction relief, plaintiff said that he
was advised of his right to appeal by
counsel, but counsel discouraged plaintiff
-5-

from pursuing a direct appeal by failing to
promptly communicate with the plaintiff and
by repeatedly advising the plaintiff that
even though his appeal "might" be
successful[,] there was a danger that
plaintiff's appeal would be unsuccessful and
establish "bad law".
(R. at 69).
Finally, in his brief on appeal, defendant includes an
uncertified transcript of a preliminary hearing held on the three
later felony charges (Exhibit "A", Brief of Appellant
[hereinafter Br* of App.]) and states other allegations which he
does not support by any cite to the record.

The transcript

supports the trial judge's recitation of facts in his ruling on
the petition for post conviction relief.

The only other matters

found in the transcript but not in the judge's ruling involve the
prosecutor's proffer, and an officer's testimony, that the
burglary and theft charges were not filed before June 11, 1984,
because further documents and investigation were needed to
determine whether the habitual criminal charge could be filed
(Br. of App., Exhibit "A" at 29-33).

Plaintiff also asserts,

without any supporting documentation or transcripts, that the
prosecutor at the time of his guilty plea to the possession of a
dangerous weapon charge said that that was the end of the
prosecution for the weapon (Br. of App. at iii-iiii).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The post conviction court properly dismissed
plaintiff's petition for post conviction relief.

Plaintiff

failed to take a direct appeal of his criminal conviction, and no
unusual circumstances were found justifying collateral relief.

Plaintiff does not allege that his trial counsel failed or
refused to pursue an appeal at plaintiff's request.

He only

alleges that his counsel advised him that an appeal would be
futile.

This is not grounds for a finding that there was an

unusual circumstance which would justify granting the petition.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there was a substantial
violation of his rights at trial such that he was not given an
fair trial.
The court below did not err in not conducting an
evidentiary hearing because it was the same court which heard the
original criminal trial.

There is no dispute or question of fact

which needed to be heard; the issue about which plaintiff wanted
to appeal is an issue of law.

The court below, and this Court,

can properly address plaintiff's legal issue without any further
evidentiary hearing.
The evidence before this Court supports the criminal
convictions of plaintiff.
Plaintiff's argument that his felony convictions were
part of a single criminal episode and were barred by an earlier
misdemeanor guilty plea is without merit.

The misdemeanor was

correctly heard by the circuit court which had jurisdiction and
venue, while the felony counts could not be tried in the circuit
court.

The felony charges correctly were bound over to and tried

in the district court.

Thus, the charges could not all have been

heard by a single court.
In addition, the crimes of burglary and theft were
completed at a certain time and location and with a certain

criminal objective which were different than the time, location
and criminal objective of the misdemeanor firearm possession
charge.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION BECAUSE IT WAS AN
ATTEMPT TO SUBSTITUTE POST CONVICTION RELIEF
FOR DIRECT APPEAL.
Plaintiff's first claim on appeal is that the trial
court erred when it dismissed his petition on the grounds that
plaintiff did not take a direct appeal of his criminal
convictions.
It is well-established that the post conviction relief
provided for in Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mis
not a substitute for and cannot be used to perform the function
of regular appellate review."
(Utah 1983).

Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101

See also Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah

1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980).

Consequently,

petitioner cannot raise issues in a post conviction proceeding
that could or should have been raised on direct appeal, except in
unusual circumstances.

Codianna v. Morris.

See also Brown v.

Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968).
The types of unusual errors which are properly
cognizable by post conviction proceedings are narrowly limited to
the following situations:

(1) When the trial court had no

jurisdiction over the person or the offense; (2) where the
requirements of law have been so disregarded that the party is
substantially and effectively denied due process of law; or (3)
-8-

where some such fact is shown that it would be wholly
unconscionable not to reexamine the conviction.

Brown v. Turner#

21 Utah 2d at 96, 440 P.2d at 969. The Court further stated in
Brown;
If the contention of error is something which
is known or should be known to the party at
the time the judgment was entered, it must be
reviewed in the manner and within the time
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or
the judgment becomes final and is not subject
to further attack, except in some unusual
circumstance. . . . Were it otherwise, the
regular rules of procedure governing appeals
and the limitations of time specified therein
would be rendered impotent.
Brown, 440 P.2d at 969.
The trial court in this post conviction proceeding
applied the analysis of Codianna and Brown when it ruled:
Habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute
for a direct appeal, except where there is a
jurisdictional question, or where the
requirements of law have been disregarded, or
that it would be wholly unconscionable not to
re-examine the conviction. The Court finds
that none of those exceptions apply here.
The same exact issues were argued prior to
the trial and were ruled upon. [Plaintiff's]
remedy was by appeal.
(R. at 107-108).

This finding of the post conviction court must

be reviewed under the standard given in Bundy v. DeLand, 7 63 P.2d
803 (Utah 1988).

In that case, the Utah Supreme Court stated:

On appeal from denial of habeas corpus
relief, "we survey the record in the light
most favorable to the findings and judgment;
and we will not reverse if there is a
reasonable basis therein to support the trial
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ
should be granted." Velasquez v. Pratt, 21
Utah 2d 229, 232, 443 P.2d 1020, 1022
(1967)[.)

_Q_

Bundy, 763 P.2d at 805,

A review of the record in the present

matter demonstrates that there is a reasonable basis to support
the post conviction court's dismissal of plaintiff's petition.
The record shows that plaintiff does not claim that he
told his trial counsel that he wanted to appeal his conviction
and that counsel refused, or that counsel agreed to, but then did
not take the appeal.

Thus, this case is distinguishable from

Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).

In Boggess, trial

counsel had been informed that Boggess wanted to take an appeal
but had not acted on that request because he felt that his
appointment as counsel had ceased after Boggess' sentencing.

The

Utah Supreme Court stated:
Unless relieved by the court, appointed
counsel is responsible to continue his or her
representation through appeal if the
defendant requests an appeal before the
statutory time has expired, unless counsel,
after a conscientious examination, finds the
appeal to be "wholly frivolous." In that
event, counsel must nevertheless pursue the
procedure outlined in Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 . . . (1966), and followed
by this Court in numerous cases.
Boggess, 635 P.2d at 40 (footnote omitted).

In the present case,

plaintiff claims that he discussed an appeal with his counsel and
his counsel discouraged him from pursuing it.

Plaintiff does not

claim that he asked his counsel to take an appeal.
It is interesting to note how plaintiff's statement in
this regard changes during the pendency of his post conviction
proceeding.

Initially, plaintiff asserted that he did not appeal

his convictions on the advice of counsel who, he said, told him
"that the State of Utah would not let [him] win an appeal." (R.

-in-

at 8).

After defendants filed a motion to dismiss, plaintiff

responded that
Plaintiff was advised of his right to appeal
by counsel, but counsel discouraged plaintiff
from pursuing a direct appeal by failing to
promptly communicate with the plaintiff and
by repeatedly advising the plaintiff that
even though his appeal "might" be successful
there was a danger that plaintiff's appeal
would be unsuccessful and establish "bad
law".
(R. at 69). Finally, in his brief, plaintiff says that he "was
advised by his trial court counsel not to appeal his conviction
because of the fact that he could set bad case law." (Br. of App.
at iiii).
Given the assertions of plaintiff as to why he did not
take a direct appeal, the record supports the post conviction
court's determination that plaintiff had not been denied due
process of law.

Even if counsel advised plaintiff that he could

not win on appeal and that an attempt to appeal would set bad
case law, plaintiff has not alleged that his counsel refused to
take an appeal.

From plaintiff's allegations, it appears that

his counsel spoke with him about his right to appeal and advised
him that it would be futile or unwise to pursue an appeal.
Evidently, with that advice, plaintiff chose not to pursue the
appeal.

If he has now changed his mind and decided that he

wanted counsel to at least file an Anders brief, that is not one
of the unusual circumstances under Brown which allows for a
substitute for direct appeal.

In addition, as will be addressed

below, plaintiff's claim that his felony convictions were barred
as a single criminal episode is without merit.

The advice from

his counsel, upon which he based his decision not to pursue an
appeal, was correct, and plaintiff was not prejudiced by his
informed decision not to take an appeal.
POINT II
SINCE THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT CAN
DETERMINE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT DEFENDANT
WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AND THAT HIS "SINGLE CRIMINAL
EPISODE" CLAIM IS WITHOUT MERIT, IT WAS NOT
ERROR TO DENY PLAINTIFF AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.
Plaintiff next claims that the post conviction trial
court committed reversible error when it dismissed his petition
without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

This Court's decision

in Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
demonstrates that the court below did not err when it declined to
conduct an evidentiary hearing in this matter.

Quoting the Utah

Supreme Court from Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343-44 (Utah
1980), this Court wrote:
[o]ne instance of an obvious injustice would
be the failure of an attorney to take an
appeal when there is a substantial claim of a
deprivation of a constitutional right which
goes to the basic fairness of the trial.
Summers, 759 P.2d at 344 (emphasis added).

This Court went on to

state that "an evidentiary hearing must ordinarily be held unless
the record of a prior hearing shows petitioner is clearly not
entitled to relief."

Summers, 759 P.2d at 345 (emphasis added).

Obviously then, if the record demonstrates that petitioner was
not entitled to relief if an appeal had been taken, an
evidentiary hearing on the petition for post conviction relief is
not required.

The only ground upon which plaintiff claims he

-1 9-

would have prefaced his direct appeal is solely an issue of law
which the post conviction court addressed, and which has been
preserved for this Court to address in the present appeal. An
evidentiary hearing would not provide any additional facts which
could assist this Court in deciding whether plaintiff's claim
regarding single criminal episode (which claim was rejected by
the post conviction court) has merit.

The merits of this claim

will be addressed in Point IV of this brief.
In the present case, the post conviction court properly
determined from the record that plaintiff was not entitled to
relief and that no hearing was necessary.

In this regard,

plaintiff was allowed to fully brief the single criminal episode
issue below and did, in fact, submit memoranda and exhibits for
the post conviction court's consideration.
complaint is one of law, not of fact.

Plaintiff's basic

The issue, as impacted by

Summers, is not whether trial counsel in the present case refused
to take an appeal, but instead, whether the failure occurred
"when there is a substantial claim of a deprivation of a
constitutional right which goes to the basic fairness of the
trial[ and upon which an appeal should be allowed]." Summers, 759
P.2d at 344.

By reaching the merits of plaintiff's single

criminal episode claim, even though plaintiff had failed to
appeal that claim, the post conviction court determined that
plaintiff had not shown a substantial claim of a deprivation of a
right which made the original criminal trial unfair.

The post

conviction court also heard the original criminal case.

The post

conviction court reviewed the earlier criminal cases upon which

-1 **-

this post conviction claim is based and determined that
plaintiff's claim that his convictions were barred under the
single criminal episode was without merit.
That this Court can address the merits of plaintiff's
claim regarding single criminal episode without a remand for an
evidentiary hearing is supported by the decision in Boggess v.
Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).

In this case, as in Boggess,

the facts upon which defendant bases his single criminal episode
claim have already been established by the court below.

Thus,

"it would be needlessly circular to require that [plaintiff]
return to the district court to re-establish the facts by a
postconviction hearingf.]"

Boggess, 635 P.2d at 42.

Plaintiff

clearly states in his petition for post conviction relief that
his ground for a direct appeal, had he decided to take one, was
that his felony convictions were barred by his guilty plea to a
misdemeanor charge under the single criminal episode doctrine.
This Court can address the merits of that claim because the claim
has been preserved for appeal in this post conviction proceeding.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PRESERVED HIS CLAIM OF
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS
CONVICTION BECAUSE HE DID NOT RAISE THAT IN
HIS PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF. IF
THE ISSUE WERE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, IT
FAILS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THIS
COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S
FELONY CONVICTIONS.
In his brief, plaintiff argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction of the felony charges.
The law is clear that appellate courts will not address an issue
raised for the first time on appeal.

As the Utah Supreme Court

stated in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987):
-14-

A general rule of appellate review in
criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such
claim of appeal.
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 551.

In the present case, plaintiff has not

preserved this issue for appeal.

No mention of a sufficiency

argument is found in either plaintiff's original petition or in
his response to defendants' motion to dismiss below.
time the issue is raised is in plaintiff's brief.

The first

The post

conviction court was not afforded the opportunity to address this
issue and plaintiff is now precluded from raising it on appeal.
See State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1988).
If this Court determines to reach this issue even
though plaintiff has not preserved it, the claim is without
merit.

Plaintiff has not included in the record on appeal any

transcript of the original criminal trial.

Thus, this Court is

at a disadvantage when deciding plaintiff's sufficiency argument.
However, the facts given by the trial court in it ruling, and
agreed to by plaintiff in his petition and in his brief on
appeal, with the addition of the preliminary hearing transcript
by plaintiff as Exhibit MA", allow this Court to determine that
the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's felony
convictions.
The standard of review in bench trials has recently
been clarified in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
52(a), as applied to criminal cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann. §
77-35-26(g) (1982).

The Utah Supreme Court held in State v.
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Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), that, in reviewing an
insufficiency of evidence claim, the appellate court must not set
aside the lower court's verdict unless it is clearly erroneous.
Walker, 743 P.2d at 193.

See also State v. Featherson, No.

880091 Slip Op. (Utah, Sept. 29, 1989); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).

The clearly erroneous standard requires

that "if the findings (or the trial court's verdict in a criminal
case) are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made, the findings (or verdict) will be
set aside." Walker, 743 P.2d at 193.

However, as this Court has

noted, the application of this standard to bench trials "does not
eliminate the traditional deference afforded the fact finder to
determine the credibility of witnesses."

State v. Wright, 744

P.2d 315, 317 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 52(a); State v. Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984)
("it is not our function to determine the credibility of
conflicting evidence or the reasonable inference to be drawn
therefrom")); see also State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983).
The evidence before this Court is that the Omega Drivein at 3490 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, was broken
into and a gun stolen from it sometime between 11:30 p.m. and
12:30 a.m. on May 21-22, 1984 (R. at 106 and Br. of App. at iii).
Plaintiff had been a cook at that drive-in and was aware of where
the gun was kept (Preliminary hearing transcript [hereinafter
PHT] at 1-3). Plaintiff had worked at the drive-in that day
until 3:00 p.m. (PHT at 2). The burglary and theft were
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discovered and reported to the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office
at 12:30 a.m. on May 22, 1984 (PHT at 7-8).
At approximately 1:40 to 1:45 a.m. on May 22, 1984,
plaintiff displayed and attempted to sell at the Old Hotel Saloon
at 380 South State Street, Salt Lake City, the same gun which had
been taken during the burglary of the drive-in (R. at 106 and PHT
at 12-13).

After the saloon closed, plaintiff got in a taxi and

was eventually arrested when the taxi was stopped by a West
Valley City police officer (Br. of App. at iii and PHT at 19 and
21-22).

When the police stopped the taxi, plaintiff tried to

dispose of the gun by laying it on the floor of the taxi and
telling the taxi driver that it was the driver's gun now (PHT at
21-22).
This evidence, which is all that plaintiff has supplied
to the Court on appeal, is sufficient to support the trial
court's verdict convicting plaintiff.

Plaintiff was in

possession of the stolen gun within an hour and a half of the
discovery of the burglary.

He was attempting to sell the gun and

then tried to dispose of it when the police officers arrived.
From these facts, the trial court could properly infer that
plaintiff had stolen the gun and broken into the drive-in for the
purpose of stealing the gun.

The evidence was sufficient to

support plaintiff's convictions for burglary and theft.

He has

not specifically challenged the conviction for habitual criminal;
no analysis will be made of that charge.
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POINT IV
PLAINTIFF'S FELONY CONVICTIONS WERE PROPER
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE
AND THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS CORRECT.
Finally, plaintiff maintains that his felony
convictions for burglary and theft were barred by his guilty plea
to the misdemeanor charge of possession of the firearm.

Based on

that claim, he alleges that the original trial court committed
reversible error when it denied his motion to dismiss the felony
charges.

The pertinent law in addressing this issue is found in

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 through 76-1-403 (1978).

Section 76-

1-401 reads:
In this part unless the context requires a
different definition, "single criminal
episode" means all conduct which is closely
related in time and is incident to an attempt
or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.
Section 76-1-402 reads, in pertinent part:
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a
single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different
provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision; an
acquittal or conviction and sentence under
any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish
separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to
promote justice, a defendant shall not be
subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the
jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time the
-ifi-

defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
Section 76-1-403 reads, in pertinent part:
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted
for one or more offenses arising out a single
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution
for the same or a different offense arising
out of the same criminal episode is barred
if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an
offense that was or should have been tried
under section 76-1-402(2) in the former
prosecution; and
(b)

The former prosecution:
• • •

(ii)

Resulted in conviction[.]

These statutes were addressed by the Utah Supreme Court
in State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979).

In that case, the

Court affirmed a conviction for felony possession of a firearm by
a restricted person.

Sosa was first charged in Ogden City Court

with two misdemeanors, carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle and
possession of marijuana.

A day later, again in the Ogden City

Court, he was charged with felony possession of a firearm by a
convicted person.

He was tried and convicted in the city court

on the misdemeanor charges and proceeded through a preliminary
hearing in the city court on the felony charge.

The felony was

bound over to the district court and Sosa was convicted of the
felony in the Second District Court.

Sosa, 598 P.2d at 343.

Sosa appealed, claiming that the district court prosecution was
barred by the single criminal episode provisions of the Utah
Code.

This argument was based on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2),

with Sosa claiming that the misdemeanor offenses and the felony
offense were within the jurisdiction of a single court.
Supreme Court rejected that argument, saying:

The Utah

District courts therefore have general
jurisdiction over all criminal matters [under
Article VIII, Sec. 7 of the Utah
Constitution] including non-indictable
misdemeanors. However, venue has
historically been held to lie in justice's
and city courts [now circuit courts]. In
State v. Johnson the Court held as follows:
The statute having laid the initial venue
of misdemeanor cases in the city or
justice's court, the parties have a legal
right to insist that the action proceed in
the proper venue. . . . It is a right
personal to the defendant to have his
cause tried in the court of proper venue,
but if he willingly submits the matter to
a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action he is bound by the
verdict or the judgment.
Sosa, 598 P.2d at 344 (footnote omitted).

In that case, the

misdemeanor charges were properly in the city court (comparable
to the present circuit court) for trial and verdict.

The felony

charge was also properly in the city (circuit) court initially
for preliminary hearing, but was then properly bound over to and
tried in the district court.

The Court rejected Sosa's claim

that the felony charge was barred because it was not filed along
with the misdemeanor charges.
This holding is applicable in the present case where
plaintiff was charged with one count of possession of a firearm
by a restricted person in the West Valley Department of the Fifth
Circuit Court (R. at 91). While it is true that the original
charge in that case was a felony, plaintiff was not bound over to
the district court because he pled guilty to a lesser offense, a
misdemeanor (R. at 91). The firearm possession charge was
properly handled in the circuit court which could not have
conducted the trial of the felony burglary, theft, and habitual

criminal charges.

The trial of the felony charges was properly

conducted by the district court after plaintiff's guilty plea to
the misdemeanor charge and a preliminary hearing and bind over on
the felony charges.
But, plaintiff's argument fails for another, more
basic, reason; the charges did not arise out of a single criminal
episode.

The Utah Supreme Court cases of State v. Cornish, 571

P.2d 577 (Utah 1977), and State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah
1977), addressed this issue.

In Cornish, the defendant was

charged with and convicted of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
Subsequent to the conviction, he was charged with failure to stop
at the command of a police officer for his attempt to evade the
officer while defendant was driving the stolen car.

Cornish, 571

P.2d at 577. The Court affirmed the conviction, finding that the
two offenses (taking the car and evading the officer) were
separated in time by nearly a day, and that the objectives in the
two crimes were different.

The Court said:

The objective of the unlawful taking was to
obtain possession, be it permanent or
temporary, of another's automobile. It was a
completed offense at the time the car was
taken. The objective of the failure to stop
was to avoid arrest for the traffic
violations he had just committed and/or to
avoid being found in a stolen motor vehicle.
Cornish, 571 P.2d at 578 (emphasis added).
In Ireland, the defendant was convicted of aggravated
robbery and aggravated kidnapping for taking a gun from a highway
patrolman in Beaver County and for detaining two hitchhikers in
Sevier County.

Ireland argued that the robbery charge was barred

because he took the gun from the officer, drove approximately 65
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miles, then picked up the hitchhikers and held them hostage.
Ireland, 570 P.2d at 1206.

In that case# the Court found that

"there was a distinct difference in time, . . . location, . . .
and the criminal objective of robbery was entirely different than
that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in time, place
or purpose.**

Ireland, 570 P. 2d at 1207.

In the present case, plaintiff was convicted of
misdemeanor possession of a firearm in West Valley City based on
being in possession of the firearm at the Old Hotel Saloon at 380
South State Street at approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 22, 1984.
This charge was a violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-503 (Supp.
1989) which reads:
(l)(a) Any person who . . . has been
convicted of any crime of violence under the
laws of the United States, the state, or any
other state, government, or country, . . .
may not own or have in his possession or
under his custody or control any dangerous
weapon . . . .
(b) Any person who violates this section
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor[.]
That crime started and ended when plaintiff was found to be in
possession of the weapon at the Old Hotel Saloon and in the taxi
at his arrest.

The criminal objective was to be in possession of

the weapon at a time when plaintiff was legally restricted from
being in possession of a weapon.

It was separate in time,

location, and criminal objective from the subsequent felony
charges.
The felony charges of which plaintiff was convicted
were completed at a time and location and with a different
criminal objective from the misdemeanor charge.
statutorily defined as:
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Burglary is

A person is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or
any portion of a building with intent to
commit a . . . theft[.]
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978).

This crime was completed the

moment plaintiff entered the Omega drive-in with the intent to
commit a theft.

Being in possession of a gun two- to two-and-a-

half hours later was not part of the same criminal episode.

The

criminal objective when entering the building to commit the theft
was not the same as the objective for being in possession of the
gun at a later time and location.
Theft is defined as:
A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978).

Plaintiff completed the theft

when he picked up the gun at the drive-in with the intent to
deprive the owner of the gun thereof.

It was not a continuing

theft when plaintiff was later found to be in possession of the
gun.

The theft was accomplished when plaintiff originally

obtained the gun.
Other cases cited by plaintiff do not assist this Court
in this matter.

The Supreme Court in State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203

(Utah 1983), held that Bair could be convicted of only one count
of theft by receiving for being in possession of several weapons
which were stolen from different victims at different times.
Even though the actual thefts of the guns were different criminal
acts, Bair had not been charged with stealing the guns.

Bair was

charged with being in possession of stolen property on the date

that a search warrant was served on his house.

Thus, he was

found to be in possession of the weapons only at that one moment
and could be convicted only of being in possession at that one
moment.

The Sosa case has been analyzed above and does not

support plaintiff's contention.
United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986)/
cited by plaintiff, does not involve a single criminal episode.
That case contained two charges of antitrust conspiracy involving
allegations that defendants rigged bids on two highway
construction projects.

The two indictments were identical except

for the names of two different highway projects upon which the
conspiracy charges were based.

That case is not applicable to

the present situation in which different charges, involving
different crimes, arose out of separate criminal episodes.
Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1986), dealt with
whether a defendant had been fully advised of the consequences of
his guilty plea such that his plea was voluntary.

The footnote

cited by plaintiff is not applicable to the present case because
the merits of plaintiff's claim have been addressed collaterally
and his due process rights have not been violated.

*i A _

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the post conviction court's dismissal of
plaintiff's petition.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/ ?5— day of November,

1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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